Definition: Group Psychology refers to the phenomenon and study of how organizations and groups behave. Terrorism has long been defined in terms of the individual psychological makeup of each actor. Some prominent scholars now agree that individual members of terrorist groups relinquish or subordinate their own identity to that of the group. Thus, to best understand how and why terrorist groups work, and how best to engage and ultimately counter them, a study of their group psychology is necessary. The participants of the 2005 Club de Madrid International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security made the case for group psychology. Jerrold Post, a prominent expert on political psychology and International Affairs, writing on behalf of the group, writes that:

A clear consensus exists that it is not individual psychology, but group, organizational and social psychology, that provides the greatest analytical power in understanding this complex phenomenon. Terrorists have subordinated their individual identity to the collective identity, so that what serves the group, organization or network is of primary importance. For some groups, especially nationalist/separatist terrorist groups, this collective identity is established extremely early: hatred, one may say, is ‘bred in the bone.’ This, in turn, emphasizes the socio-cultural context, which determines the balance between collective and individual identity.

The causes of terrorism seem almost impossible for anyone to define. Here’s why: they change over time. Listen to terrorists in different periods and you’ll hear different explanations. Then, listen to the scholars who explain terrorism. Their ideas change over time too, as new trends in academic thinking take hold.

Many writers begin statements about “the causes of terrorism” as if terrorism were a scientific phenomenon whose characteristics are fixed for all time, like the ’causes’ of a disease, or the ’causes’ of rock formations. Terrorism isn’t a natural phenomenon though. It is name given by people about other people’s actions in the social world.

Both terrorists and terrorism’s explainers are influenced by dominant trends in political and scholarly thought. Terrorists—people who threaten or use violence against civilians with the hope of changing the status quo—perceive the status quo in ways that accord with the era they live in. People who explain terrorism are also influenced by prominent trends in their professions. These trends change over time.

Viewing Trends in Terrorism Will Help Solve It

Viewing terrorism as the extreme edge of mainstream trends helps us understand, and thus seek solutions, to it. When we view terrorists as evil or beyond explanation, we are inaccurate and unhelpful. We cannot ‘solve’ an evil. We can only live fearfully in its shadow. Even if it is uncomfortable to think of people who do terrible things to innocent people as part of our same world, I believe it is important to try. You will see in the list below that people who have chosen terrorism in the last century have been influenced by the same broad trends that we all have. The difference is, they chose violence as a response.

1920s – 1930s: Socialism as a Cause

In the early 20th century, terrorists justified violence in the name of anarchism, socialism and communism. Socialism was becoming a dominant way for many people to explain the political and economic injustice they saw developing in capitalist societies, and for defining a solution. Millions of people expressed their commitment to a socialist future without violence, but a small number of people in the world thought violence was necessary.

1950s – 1980s: Nationalism as a Cause

In the 1950s through 1980s, terrorist violence tended to have a nationalist component. Terrorist violence in these years reflected the post-World War II trend in which previously suppressed populations committed violence against states that had not given them a voice in the political process. Algerian terrorism against French rule; Basque violence against the Spanish state; Kurdish actions against Turkey; the Black Panthers and Puerto Rican militants in the United States all sought a version of independence from oppressive rule.

Scholars in this period began seeking to understand terrorism in psychological terms. They wanted to understand what motivated individual terrorists. This related to the rise of psychology and psychiatry in other related realms, such as criminal justice.

1980s – Today: Religious Justifications as a Cause

In the 1980s and 1990s, terrorism began to appear in the repertoire of right-wing, neo-Nazi or neo-fascist, racist groups. Like the terrorist actors that preceded them, these violent groups reflected the extreme edge of a broader and not-necessarily violent backlash against developments during the civil rights era. White, Western European or American men, in particular, grew fearful of a world beginning to grant recognition, political rights, economic franchise and freedom of movement (in the form of immigration) to ethnic minorities and women, who might seem to be taking their jobs and position.

In Europe and the United States, as well as elsewhere, the 1980s represented a time when the welfare state had expanded in the United States and Europe, the agitation of the civil rights movement had produced results, and globalization, in the form of multi-national corporations, had gotten underway, producing economic dislocation among many who depended on manufacturing for a living. Timothy McVeigh’s bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building, the most lethal terrorist attack in the U.S. until the 9/11 attacks, exemplified this trend.

In the Middle East, a similar swing toward conservatism was taking hold in the 1980s and 1990s, although it had a different face than it did in Western democracies. The secular, socialist framework that had been dominant the world over—-from Cuba to Chicago to Cairo-—faded after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the death in 1970 of Egyptian president Gamal Abd Al Nasser. The failure in the 1967 war was a big blow—it disillusioned Arabs about the entire era of Arab socialism.

Economic dislocations because of the Gulf War in the 1990s caused many Palestinian, Egyptian and other men working in the Persian Gulf to lose their jobs. When they returned home, they found women had assumed their roles in households and jobs. Religious conservatism, including the idea that women should be modest and not work, took hold in this atmosphere. In this way, both West and East saw a rise in fundamentalism in the 1990s.

Terrorism scholars began to notice this rise in religious language and sensibility in terrorism as well. The Japanese Aum Shinrikyo, Islamic Jihad in Egypt, and groups such as the Army of God in the United States were willing to use religion to justify violence. Religion is the primary way that terrorism is explained today. 

Future: Environment as a Cause

New terrorism forms and new explanations are underway, however. Special interest terrorism is used to describe people and groups who commit violence on behalf of a very specific cause. These are often environmental in nature. Some predict the rise of ‘green’ terrorism in Europe–violent sabotage on behalf of environmental policy. Animal rights activists have also revealed a fringe violent edge. Just as in earlier eras, these forms of violence mimic the dominant concerns of our time across the political spectrum.

All terrorist acts are motivated by two things:

• Social and political injustice: People choose terrorism when they are trying to right what they perceive to be a social or political or historical wrong—when they have been stripped of their land or rights, or denied these.
• The belief that violence or its threat will be effective, and usher in change. Another way of saying this is: the belief that violent means justify the ends. Many terrorists in history said sincerely that they chose violence after long deliberation, because they felt they had no choice.

This explanation of the causes of terrorism may be difficult to swallow. It sounds too simple, or too theoretical. However, if you look at any group that is widely understood as a terrorist group, you will find these two elements are basic to their story.

• Zionists who bombed British targets in 1930s mandate Palestine felt they must do so in order to create a Jewish state.
• The IRA (Irish Republican Army) bombed English targets in the 1980s to make the point that they felt their land was colonized by British imperialists.
• In the 1960s and 1970s, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine felt that armed attacks in Israel were a justifiable response to the usurpation of their land.
• Osama bin Laden’s declaration of war on American interests in the 1990s stemmed from his belief that U.S. troops stationed in Saudi Arabia represented an abomination to the kind of Islamic state he believed should exist in the Arabian peninsula.
• Uighur separatists in China today feel that Chinese religious repression (the Uighur Chinese are Muslims) justifies their terrorist tactics.
• In some cases, people choose terrorist tactics based on a cause whose righteousness they believe in to the exclusion of nearly all else. Abortion clinic bombers in the 1990s and groups such as the Animal Liberation Front believe zealously in their causes.People who choose terrorist tactics are also persuaded that violence, or the threat of violence, is effective.

  There is some question about who actually ‘chooses’ terrorism, and it may be unfair to think of young recruits, such as some suicide bombers today, who are seduced by cult-like methods of indoctrination as completely culpable for their choices.

  Asking a Better Question: What Conditions Are Favorable for Terrorism

  In fact, the question, “what causes terrorism?” is not quite the right question to be asking, because we will never be able to answer it. We cannot say that the presence of one factor provokes terrorism in the same way that we can say with scientific certainty that certain toxins cause diseases.

  If you listen closely to the explanations that are usually given as answers to the question, “What is terrorism?” you will find that they actually answer the question: “What are the conditions in which terrorism is most likely to take place?” Sometimes these conditions have to do with the people who become terrorists (they are described as having certain psychological traits, like ‘narcissistic rage’) and some conditions have to do with the circumstances they live in (a poor society; a formerly colonized society, for example).

  Although many people today believe that that religious fanaticism “causes” terrorism, it isn’t true. It may be true that religious fanaticism creates conditions that are favorable for terrorism. But we know that religious zealotry does not ’cause’ terrorism because there are many religious fanatics who do not choose terrorism or any form of violence. So there must also be other conditions that in combination provoke some people to see terrorism as an effective way of creating change in their world.

  There are two more reasons why asking, “What conditions create a favorable climate for terrorism?” is better than asking about causes The first is, it makes it easy to remember that there are always at least several conditions. Terrorism is a complex phenomenon; it is a specific kind of political violence committed by people who do not have legitimate army at their disposal. A second reason that has been useful for me, as I ask questions about terrorism, is that thinking in terms of ‘conditions’ helps me remember that people have a choice about whether to use violence.

  There is nothing inside any person nor in their circumstances that sends them—like a monopoly piece headed directly to “Go”—directly to terrorism. Instead, there are certain conditions, some of which make violence against civilians seem like a reasonable, and even necessary option. Despite this, and some of the deeply unforgivable circumstances that foster terrorism, people always have the free will to seek another course of action.

A reader from the UK wrote this week wondering what makes “the new terrorism,” a term that has been in circulation since the late 1990s, distinct from the old terrorism.

I am hearing the phrase ‘New Terrorism’ often. What is your opinion of the definition of this phrase and am I correct in thinking that it is based upon religious rather than political extremist ideology, and that the weapons considered for use against targets are potentially more devastating i.e. Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN)?

A reasonable query indeed, and one that –like many others – has in no way been answered in one definitive way by those who study terrorism professionally.

The term “new terrorism,” came into its own after the September 11, 2001 attacks, but it is itself not new. In 1986, the Canadian news magazine, Macleans, published “The Menacing Face of the New Terrorism.” It identified a war against the “perceived decadence and immorality of the West” by Middle Eastern, “mobile, well-trained, suicidal and savagely unpredictable” “Islamic fundamentalists.” More frequently, “new” terrorism has been focused on a perceived new threat of mass casualties caused by chemical, biological or other agents. Discussions of “new terrorism” are often highly alarmist: it is described as “far more lethal than anything that has come before it,” “a terrorism that seeks the total collapse of its opponents” (Dore Gold, the American Spectator, March/ April 2003).

The UK writer is correct in thinking that when people do make use of the idea of a “new terrorism,” they mean at least some of the following:

• The “new terrorism” aims at destruction as an end in itself, while the “old terrorism” used violent destruction as a means to a political end;
• The “new terrorism” aims, therefore, at as much destruction as possible, whether through devastating forms of weaponry or techniques such as suicide terrorism, whereas the “old terrorism” sought to create a dramatic spectacle with as little damage as possible;
• The “new terrorism” is organizationally distinct from the “old terrorism.” It is heterarchical (has many equally authoritative points of authority) and horizontal, rather than hierarchical and vertical; it is decentralized rather than centralized. (You might notice that corporations, social groups and other institutions are also frequently described in these terms as well);
• The “new terrorism” is justified on religious and apocalyptic grounds, while the “old terrorism” was rooted in political ideology.

New Terrorism Not So New, After All

On its face, these simple distinctions between new and old terrorism sound rational, especially because they are tightly bound to recent discussions of al-Qaeda, the most highly discussed terrorist network of recent years.

When held up to history and analysis, the distinction between old and new falls apart. According to Professor Martha Crenshaw, whose first article on terrorism was published in 1972, we need to take a longer view to understand this phenomenon:

The idea that the world confronts a “new” terrorism completely unlike the terrorism of the past has taken hold in the minds of policy makers, pundits, consultants, and academics, especially in the US. However, terrorism remains an intrinsically political rather than cultural phenomenon and, as such, the terrorism of today is not fundamentally or qualitatively “new”, but grounded in an evolving historical context. The idea of a “new” terrorism is often based on insufficient knowledge of history, as well as misinterpretations of contemporary terrorism. Such thinking is often contradictory. For example, it is not clear when the “new” terrorism began or the old ended, or which groups belong in which category. (In Palestine Israel Journal, March 30, 2003)

Crenshaw goes on to explain the flaws in broad generalizations about “new” and “old” terrorism. Speaking generally, the problem with most of the distinctions is that they aren’t true because there are so many exceptions to the supposed rules of new and old.

Crenshaw’s most important point is that terrorism remains an “intrinsically political” phenomenon. This means that people who choose terrorism act, as they always have, out of discontent with how society is organized and run, and who has the power to run it. To say that terrorism is political, rather than cultural or religious, also suggests that terrorists are responding to their contemporary environment, rather than acting out of an internally coherent belief system that has no relationship to the world around it.

If this is true, then why do today’s terrorists so often sound religious? Why do they speak in divine absolutes, while the “old” terrorists spoke in terms of national liberation, or social justice?

They sound that way because, as Crenshaw puts it, terrorism is grounded in an “evolving historical context.” In the last generation, that context has included the rise of religiosity, the politicization of religion, and the tendency to speak politics in a religious idiom in mainstream, as well as violent extremist, circles, both East and West. Mark Juergensmeyer, who has written much on religious terrorism, has described bin Laden as “religionizing politics.” In places where political speech is officially muted, religion can offer an acceptable vocabulary for voicing an entire range of concerns.
We might wonder why, if there isn’t really a “new” terrorism, so many have spoken of one.

Here are a few suggestions:

• The first efforts to describe a ‘new’ form of terrorism, in the 1990s, were generally by professional students of terrorism attempting to make sense of phenomena that did not fit into the model that evolved in the 1970s and 1980s out of left-leaning national liberation movements. Attacks such as that of the religious cult Aum Shinrikyo did not make sense without a reconsideration of the model.
• Simplifying schematics such as “old” and “new” make complex phenomena seem simple, which is intellectually satisfying and emotionally comforting in a complicated world;
• When people do not know the historical or cultural context of a phenomenon, anything that they do not recognize may indeed look “new.” In reality, it is simply new to them;
• Although individuals who write about “new” terrorism after 9/11 may not be aware of it, their claim of unprecedented lethality is a political argument that favors putting more resources into terrorism (which does not kill as many people as heart disease, or poverty) precisely because it is so lethal;
• It is difficult for any cause to draw attention in crowded media space. Claiming “newness” is one way to distinguish a phenomenon, and it is easier to digest than explanations of complicated historical facts.
• Identifying a new phenomenon can help a writer gain attention or build a career.

Researchers in the United States began to distinguish different types of terrorism in the 1970s, following a decade in which both domestic and international groups flourished. By that point, modern groups had began to use techniques such as hijacking, bombing, diplomatic kidnapping and assassination to assert their demands and, for the first time, they appeared as real threats to Western democracies, in the view of politicians, law makers, law enforcement and researchers. They began to distinguish different types of terrorism as part of the larger effort to understand how to counter and deter it.

State Terrorism

Bioterrorism

• Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis)
• Botulism (Clostridium botulinum toxin)
• The Plague (Yersinia pestis)
• Smallpox (Variola major)
• Tularemia (Francisella tularensis)
• Hemorrahagic fever, due to Ebola Virus or Marburg Virus

Cyberterrorism

The gunmen barged into the guesthouse at 5 a.m. in the Shirpoor diplomatic enclave and opened indiscriminate fire, killing the UN staff instantly, a police official told Xinhua news agency.
Three guards of the compound were also killed in a gunfight that erupted between the attackers and the startled security forces.

The guesthouse accommodates the international staff of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). The Taliban is bitterly opposed to the UN. Wednesday’s attack came ahead of the Nov 7 presidential runoff election.

 Plumes of smoke rose above buildings in the Afghan capital’s Shar-e-paw area as the gun battles raged between the suicide bombers and the security personnel.
Interior ministry spokesperson Zmarai Bashari confirmed that three suicide bombers were killed.
Police said the firefight lasted an hour and a half and ended with all the militants killed or captured, DPA said. 

A short while after the attack on the UN guesthouse, two rockets fired from an unknown location slammed next to Kabul’s only five-star as well as fortified hotel, Kabul Serena. The hotel is located near the presidential palace and the foreign ministry.

 The hotel usually accommodates high ranking foreign guests and officials.

The Taiban, which has dramatically stepped up its war against American forces, claimed responsibility for the first attack.

Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid told the media from an undisclosed location over telephone that the attack sought to disrupt the runoff vote, Xinhua reported.

On Oct 8, a Taliban suicide bomber exploded near the Indian embassy here killing 12 people and injuring nearly 90. The explosion was the second such attack since 2008.

In July last year, over 50 people, including two Indian diplomats and two Indian security personnel, were killed in a similar suicide attack at the embassy.

The street where the blasts occurred had been reopened to vehicle traffic just six months ago. Shortly after, blast walls were repositioned to allow traffic closer to the government buildings — all measures hailed by al-Maliki as a sign that safety was returning to the city.

Helpless civilians have paid for that, as the death toll from two huge blasts yesterday continues to rise.

As the floodwater from broken water mains and sewers drained away, workers continued to hunt for victims amid the wreckage from Sunday’s bomb blasts, recovering still more bodies on Monday as the death toll climbed to as much as 155 — including an uncertain number of children — with more than 500 wounded.
The extent of the damage was even worse than initially feared, with three major government buildings destroyed rather than the two reported in the hours after Sunday’s pair of suicide vehicle bombs.

This tragedy is likely to be followed by calls from U.S. neo-calls for President Obama to delay pulling U.S. troops of of Iraq, even as those same neo-cons demand Obama send tens of thousands more troops to Afghanistan. No. The U.S. should never have invaded Iraq; and we certainly shouldn’t be in the middle of sectarian warfare.
Besides, the Iraqis have asked us to leave. We should, sooner rather than later.

Pakistan has long been considered a missing link for the U.S. in the war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Taliban leaders and fighters escaped into the Pakistani highlands on the border early on and regained strengths there, unbothered by the Pakistani government, which long denied their presence.

The groups have had an influence on operations in Pakistan for decades under the name of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an umbrella terrorist group.

Pakistani officials said the TTP has been behind 80 percent of terrorist attacks in the country over the last few years, including the assassination of presidential candidate Benazir Bhutto in 2007 and the recent spate of violence.

Pakistan is conscious of the danger that the Taliban and Al Qaeda pose to its national security, but has been held back from action by internal instability and political turmoil.

The first offensive against a terrorist stronghold was executed earlier this year in the Swat Valley, yet it became clear that the insurgent problem had deeper roots and would require further military action.

This past week, another offensive was launched in the South Waziristan region, which is considered the center of operations for the TTP.

The area suffered heavy bombardments prior to the ground offensive, meant to weaken militant fortifications in the mountainous region. 28,000 Pakistani soldiers have been deployed to the area in order to trap the approximated 10,000 militants by sealing all exit points.

Pakistani security forces have ruled out the option of a peace agreement.

The struggle will continue until the presence of militants in the area has been completely eliminated. This will prove to be an extremely complicated task, for the mountainous region provides endless hideouts and opportunities for ambush. So far, the resistance has been fierce. There are already numerous casualties on both sides, with the exact numbers still unclear.

On the verge of the attack, the top U.S. military commander for the Middle East, Gen. David Petraeus, and Senator John Kerry, head of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, traveled to Pakistan in order to share intelligence and ratify the U.S. support for the military action.

The details of their visits remained secret, for the Pakistani government does not want the strategy to be seen as a move to please the U.S.

This could spark internal revolt since anti-American sentiment is still extremely high among the Pakistani population. This is also why the Pakistani military command has declined several U.S. offers to provide help on the battlefield. It is shielding its image and wants to be seen as acting independently from the U.S. forces to defend its own national sovereignty.

There have been rumors about the U.S. providing financial support to the Pakistani military to combat the Taliban in its own territory, yet no official information about such a transaction has been provided.
Naturally, the Pakistani government denies this fact, as accepting funds from the U.S. would damage its image in the region.

One thing has become certain as the situation in the Middle East progresses. Though conflicts seemed to be traditionally limited to Afghanistan and Iraq, the focus has recently shifted towards Pakistan’s struggles against the Taliban and Iran’s dangerous nuclear ambition.

These challenges are becoming central to the agenda and, added on to the inherited conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, they will provide a tough challenge in the coming years.